題目：Group Buying Mechanisms under Quantity Discounts
報(bào)告人：Rachel Chen（UC Davis教授，）

時(shí)間：7月8日 10:15

地點(diǎn)：經(jīng)管學(xué)院335會(huì)議室

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報(bào)告摘要：

When a seller offers quantity discounts, interested buyers may either self-organize or rely on a third party to aggregate their purchasing quantities to obtain lower prices, referred to as group buying. A group buying mechanism is a set of rules that determine the amount each buyer will purchase and the price each buyer will pay. In this paper, we analyze and compare the outcomes of group buying given a seller's quantity discount schedule under both the uniform price (where buyers pay at the same unit price obtained by the group) and non-uniform price group buying mechanisms.
報(bào)告人簡(jiǎn)介

Rachel Chen博士本科畢業(yè)于同濟(jì)大學(xué)計(jì)算機(jī)科學(xué)專業(yè)，碩士畢業(yè)于復(fù)旦大學(xué)管理信息系統(tǒng)專業(yè)，于2002年獲得康奈爾大學(xué)運(yùn)營(yíng)管理專業(yè)博士學(xué)位。Rachel Chen博士主要從事運(yùn)營(yíng)研究、供應(yīng)鏈管理，服務(wù)運(yùn)營(yíng)和動(dòng)態(tài)定價(jià)領(lǐng)域的研究。她目前有多篇論文發(fā)表在國(guó)際頂級(jí)期刊如IIE Transactions, Management Science, Marketing Science, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Operations Research Letters, 和Production and Operations Management上。她曾擔(dān)任Decision Science的副主編, 現(xiàn)為《Decision Science Journal》、《IIE Transactions》、《Production and Operations Management》編委。?