報告題目：Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition and Future Competition
報告人：王云增教授（加州大學河濱分校安德森商學院院長，終身教授）
時間：2018年1月16日下午14：00-15:30
地點：經管學院206，歡迎相關專業老師和管理科學與工程專業研究生參加！
?
Yunzeng Wang
School of Business Administration and A.
“Bundled Procurement for Technology Acquisition and Future Competition”
?
Abstract: Consider a buyer who would like to procure certain products for current consumption and the underlying technologies so that he can become a supplier and compete with current suppliers in the future market. One potential procurement mechanism for such a buyer is to bundle the procurement project with technology acquisition. We propose a dynamic stochastic game-theoretic model that analyzes the optimal technology o?er strategies of the asymmetric suppliers and highlights how the size of the current project, relative to the size of the future market, and supplier competition determine the e?ectiveness of the bundled procurement
mechanism for the buyer. We ?nd that a project size of 5% to 10% of the future market is su?cient for the suppliers to o?er their best technologies. Under such conditions, the premium for the buyer to pay for technology acquisition is relatively small, compared to the pro?t the buyer achieves by becoming a future technology supplier and competing with existing suppliers in the future market.
?
王云增教授是加州大學河濱分校安德森商學院院長, 終身教授。 1986年畢業于哈爾濱工業大學后進入加拿大滑鐵盧大學獲得管理科學碩士。1998年獲得沃頓商學院（賓夕法尼亞大學）運營管理專業博士學位。先后在德克薩斯大學達拉斯分校，加州大學河濱分校任副教授，教授，并歷任副院長和院長。他的研究主要關注合同理論，博弈理論，供應鏈管理和動態規劃，中美經濟及教育發展與合作等。曾在管理科學領域頂級或一流期刊如Operations Research，Management Science和M&SOM等發表多篇論文, 并擔任POMS, IIE Transactions，Decision Sciences等國際一流期刊的副主編或高級編輯，是領域內國際知名專家。
