報(bào)告題目：Tacit collusion between two terminals of a port

報(bào)告人：黃榮兵（上海海事大學(xué)講座教授，York大學(xué)管理科學(xué)副教授）

時(shí)間：6月1日10:15

地點(diǎn)：經(jīng)管335室

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Abstract

For the past many years, a dual-track system has been implemented on port charges in mainland China. The vast majority of container ports refer to the standard rates specified by China’s Ministry of Transport, which released the container stevedoring rates for the first time on September 1, 1976. After a total of thirteen times of rate adjustments, the latest was modified on December 24, 2001, but still at a lower level comparing to the international average. Notice of Liberalization Port Competitive Service Charges was issued by China’s Ministry of Transport and National Development and Reform Commission on November 22, 2014, transforming the rates from governmental guidance and uniform pricing into market regulation. On the other hand, with joint venture terminals established to obtain substantial capital investment required, the separation of ownership and operation of container terminals will make price competition fierce among container terminals in one port area. In this study we analyze in detail price matching policies of two container terminals in one port area. Our main finding is that price matching strategies facilitate tacit collusion between container terminals.

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??????? 黃榮兵教授畢業(yè)于加拿大多倫多大學(xué)的Rotman管理學(xué)院，獲運(yùn)營(yíng)管理專業(yè)博士學(xué)位。主要從事多目標(biāo)與多種類設(shè)施的選址研究、物流網(wǎng)絡(luò)優(yōu)化及供應(yīng)鏈優(yōu)化研究。論文主要發(fā)表于運(yùn)籌學(xué)類雜志，如IIE Transactions, Transportation Science, European Journal of Operational Research, Computers & Operations Research, International Journal of Production Economics, Annals of Operations Research， Journal of Operational Research Society等。