題 目：Bargaining and Sharing Revenue with a Big Retailer in Channel Selection
報(bào)告人：戴悅 教授（復(fù)旦大學(xué)）
時(shí) 間：4月10（周五）13:00-14:40
地 點(diǎn)：經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院335會(huì)議室
報(bào)告摘要：
Motivated by the electronic appliances market in China, we study a manufacturer?s channel selection problem with two asymmetric retailers. The big retailer operates a store-within-a-store model, where the manufacturer sets up his own store, pays the slotting fee and a portion of the revenue to the retailer. The small retailer is a traditional reseller, which might be independent or integrated by the manufacturer. We formulate a three-stage game for the manufacturer?s channel selection problem and analyze three mechanisms determining the transaction terms: (1) the revenue-sharing rate and the slotting fee are both negotiable, (2) the revenue-sharing rate alone is negotiable while the slotting fee is exogenously given, (3) the revenue-sharing rate is decided by the big retailer and the slotting fee is exogenous. Our findings include: the bargaining mechanisms (1) and (2) result in the two payment themes as observed in the practice; between the manufacturer and the big retailer, the latter prefers bargaining over both the revenue-sharing rate and the slotting fee while the former favors bargaining over the revenue-sharing rate solely; when the revenue-sharing rate alone is negotiable, the big retailer will achieve a higher revenue share if the slotting fee is lower; when the transaction term is single handedly determined by the big retailer rather than being negotiated, the big retailer might squeeze out the profit of the manufacturer and result in a lose-lose situation in the channel.
報(bào)告人簡介：
戴悅，復(fù)旦大學(xué)管理學(xué)院教授，美國北卡州立大學(xué)工業(yè)工程博士，美國麻省理工學(xué)院斯隆管理學(xué)院/香港城市大學(xué)訪問學(xué)者。教育部新世紀(jì)優(yōu)秀人才，國家自然科學(xué)基金優(yōu)秀青年基金（首屆）獲得者，復(fù)旦大學(xué)卓識計(jì)劃人選，2009年 “Most Cited Articles By Chinese Mainland Authors 2004-2008, Elsevier Economics Journals”榮譽(yù)稱號。已發(fā)表國際頂級期刊論文多篇。研究方向：供應(yīng)鏈管理, 收益管理，物流管理, 博弈論，庫存控制等。
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