主題：Impact of Capacity on the Supplier's Distribution
主要內容：In the presence of agency selling in emerging retail platforms, suppliers are motivated to select purely traditional reselling, only agency selling or a hybrid distribution channel strategy. In this paper, considering a capacity-constrained supplier facing a retail platform, we examine the equilibrium pricing and ordering decisions in the hybrid channel, and further analyze the impact of capacity constraint on the supplier's distribution channel selection as well as equilibrium outcomes. Results show that the hybrid channel always dominates pure agency selling for both the supplier and retail platform. In comparison to the unlimited capacity setting, we find that capacity constraint motivates the supplier to select pure reselling under a low commission rate. However, under a moderate commission rate, moderate capacity constraint motivates the supplier to select the hybrid channel. We also show that, under moderate capacity constraint in the hybrid channel, the retail platform may order all the supplier's capacity and strategically withhold some to avoid downstream competition, and that the impact of commission rate on the possibility of withholding behavior may be non-monotonic. Contrary to our intuition, we find that moderate capacity constraint may benefit the supplier, the retail platform, and consumers at the same time, creating a win-win-win outcome.
專家姓名：戴賓
工作單位：武漢大學
專長和學術成就：供應鏈管理領域的優秀學者
專家簡介：武漢大學經濟與管理學院教授、博士生導師，武漢大學珞珈青年學者，湖北省楚天學子。西安交通大學本科，香港科技大學碩士和博士。主要研究方向是電子商務供應鏈優化、召回供應鏈管理、共享經濟等。在NRL, IIE Transactions, EJOR, IJPE, IJPR, TRE,系統工程理論與實踐、中國管理科學等國內外重要學術期刊發表論文20余篇。主持國家自然科學基金2項，主持國家自科基金重點項目子課題2項，其中自科基金青年項目后評估特優。曾獲國際工業工程師雜志Featured Article，武漢大學人文社會科學優秀成果獎一等獎，湖北省社會科學優秀成果二等獎等。
時間：2020-11-17 13:30:00
地點：經濟管理學院335