本次研討會邀請了國內外供應鏈管理領域的六位教授就目前供應鏈管理研究的前沿問題展開討論。具體內容及時間安排如下:
講座（1）
題 目：Ocean Container Transport Logistics: Challenges and Opportunities
報告人：李忠義教授,香港科技大學
時 間：6月19日（周五）8:40-10:10
地 點：行政樓128會議室
報告摘要：
As supply chains become more global, and more operations are outsourcing and move offshore, ocean container transport now is a critical element of any such supply chain. ?In particular, due to the tightened security, increased congestion, slow steaming, and heightened pressure on energy usage and carbon emission, the immediate effect of ocean transportation on supply chain has recently attracted much attention. In this talk, I will present a number of problems and related research questions that have been understudied in the literature and yet appear to be challenging for both container shipping service providers and users. ?Progress of a theme-based research project will also be presented.?
報告人簡介：
Chung-Yee Lee received a B.S. degree in Electronic Engineering (1972) and a MS degree in Management Sciences (1976) both from National Chiao-Tung University in Taiwan. He also received a M.S. degree in Industrial Engineering from Northwestern University (1980) and Ph.D degree in Operations Research from Yale University (1984). ?He is currently a Chair Professor/Cheong Ying Chan Professor of Engineering with the Department of Industrial Engineering and Logistics Management, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST). He is the Founding and Current Director of Logistics and Supply Chain Management Institute at HKUST. He served as Department Head for seven years (2001–2008). Before joined HKUST in 2001, he was Rockwell Chair Professor at Texas A&M University. He is a Fellow of the Institute of Industrial Engineers in U.S. and also a Fellow of Hong Kong Academy of Engineering Sciences. His search areas are in logistics and supply chain management, scheduling and inventory management. He has published more than 140 papers in refereed journals. According to an article in Int. J. Prod. Eco.(2009), which looked at all papers published in the 20 core journals during last 50 years in the field of production and operations management, he was ranked No. 6 among all researchers worldwide in h-index.?
講座（2）
題 目：Sequential selling and information dissemination in the presence of network effects
報告人：陳瀅儒副教授, 香港科技大學
時 間：6月19日（周五）10:30-12:00
地 點：行政樓128會議室
報告摘要：
In this paper, we examine how a seller sells a product/service with a positive consumption externality, and customers are uncertain about the product's/service's value. Because early adopters learn this value, we consider the customers' intrinsic signaling incentives and positive feedback effects. Anticipating this, the seller commits to provide price discounts to the followers, and charges the leader a high price. Thus, the profit-maximizing pricing features the cream skimming strategy. We also show that the lack of seller's commitment is detrimental to the social welfare; nonetheless, the sequential selling still boosts up the seller's profit compared with the simultaneous-selling case.?
Embedding a physical network with arbitrary payoff externality among customers, we investigate the optimal targeting strategy in the presence of information asymmetry. We provide precise indices for this leader selection problem. For undirected graphs, we should simply choose the player with the highest degree, irrespective of the seller's commitment power. Going beyond this family of networks, in general the seller's commitment power affects the optimal targeting strategy. We also consider the general hierarchical design problem of information dissemination and prove the optimality of chain structure.?
報告人簡介：
Ying-Ju Chen holds a joint appointment between School of Business and Management (Department of ISOM) and School of Engineering (Department of IELM) at HKUST. Prior to the current position, he was a faculty in the Department of IEOR at UC Berkeley. He obtained a PhD degree in Operations Management from Stern School of Business at New York University in 2007, and he also holds master's and bachelor's degrees of Electrical Engineering from National Taiwan University.?
He is a recipient of NYU teaching excellence award, Harold W. Kuhn Award of Naval Research Logistics, Second place of INFORMS Junior Faculty Interest Group (JFIG) paper competition, Best paper award of CSAMSE (third prize), the Harold MacDowell Award from Stern School, and other awards and fellowships during his academic journey. His current research interests lie in socially responsible operations, operations-marketing interface, and supply chain management. His work has appeared in several leading conferences and journals in the fields of accounting, economics, electrical engineering, information systems, marketing, and operations research.
講座（3）
題 目：大數據環境下商務管理的思考
報告人：陳劍教授，清華大學
時 間：6月19日（周五）13:30-15:00
地 點：行政樓128會議室
報告摘要：
“大數據”一詞出現后即受到各方的追捧。人們預期它將對國家治理、企業決策、組織和業務流程以及個人的生活等方方面面產生巨大的影響。本報告試圖從商務管理的視角，分析大數據所帶來的商務模式變革以及相應的挑戰，并提出大數據環境下的商務管理方面值得思考和研究的問題。
報告人簡介：
陳劍教授，清華大學經濟管理學院管理科學與工程系聯想講席教授（Lenovo Chair Professor）、博士生導師，清華大學經濟管理學院管理科學與工程系系主任，教育部人文社會科學重點研究基地——清華大學現代管理研究中心主任。于 1983 年獲得清華大學電機系學士學位，1986 年獲得清華大學自動化系碩士學位，1989 年獲得清華經濟管理學院博士學位。主要研究領域為供應鏈管理、電子商務、商務智能與決策分析、系統優化與預測技術等。
講座（4）
題 目：Two Newsvendors with Inventory Transshipment under Limited Supply
報告人：戴悅教授，復旦大學
時 間：6月19日（周五）15:20-16:50
地 點：行政樓128會議室
報告摘要：
Inventory transshipment between two newsvendors may generate a higher profit and has been shown to influence the newsvendors' strategic inventory decisions. We study a supply chain with inventory transshipment where two newsvendors place orders to a common supplier whose capacity is limited. If the newsvendors' total order quantity exceeds the capacity, all available supply will be allocated to them according to a pre-announced rule. After the demand is realized, the surplus inventory of one newsvendor may be transshipped, at an exogenous and fixed price, to the other newsvendor who has excess demand. In this newsvendor game, a Nash equilibrium of ordering decisions does not always exist. We investigate conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, we show that the total newsvendor profit at the Nash equilibrium is non-decreasing in the supply capacity. Moreover, in some special cases, we identify the appropriate allocation rules such that the first-best inventory stocks under unlimited supply may lead to first-best inventory allocation under limited supply. An interesting effect of the supply constraint is that, inventory transshipment may not always benefit both newsvendors in terms of equilibrium profit, compared to the game under the same supply constraint but without inventory transshipment. Nevertheless, we show that at least one newsvendor can still benefit from inventory transshipment. Accordingly, we construct a coordinating contract that allows the newsvendors to negotiate the transshipment prices before placing orders to maximize the total profit such that both newsvendors can benefit from inventory transshipment.
報告人簡介：
戴悅，復旦大學管理學院管理科學系教授。主要研究方向為供應鏈管理,博弈論等，目前關注于市場營銷和供應鏈管理的交互研究。研究成果發表于Marketing Science，Production and Operations Management等國際期刊上。研究課題包括國家自然科學基金優秀青年科學基金項目，教育部“新世紀優秀人才支持計劃”，及多項國際課題。負責講授各個層次的供應鏈管理和運營管理課程。她于美國北卡羅萊納州立大學工業工程系獲得博士學位。
講座（5）
題 目：Price Matching Negotiation in Competitive Channels
報告人：蔡港樹副教授，Santa Clara University（美國）
時 間：6月20日（周六）8：30-10:00
地 點：行政樓128會議室
報告摘要：
In price matching negotiation (PM), a channel matches its price with the resulting whole- sale price bargained earlier by the other channel. We investigate this negotiation mechanism and compare it with two benchmarks, simultaneous negotiation (SN) and sequential negotiation ?(SQ). Through a common-seller two-buyer Bertrand competition model, we find that in PM the seller prefers to negotiate with the less powerful buyer, whereas in SQ the seller prefers to negotiate with the more powerful buyer first. Firms have different preferences for PM and the benchmarks, and their discrepancy is irreconcilable. With side payment or profit sharing coordination, however, PM can emerge as a mutually beneficial choice for all firms as compared to SN and SQ. We also study seller collusion in a bilateral channel model and find that PM incurs fewer collusion incentives than SN and SQ. When the buyers have asymmetric market sizes, ceteris paribus, the seller prefers to negotiate with the bigger buyer in PM. We finally demonstrate that our main qualitative results are robust in Cournot competition.
報告人簡介：
Bio: Dr. Gangshu Cai (蔡港樹) is a tenured associate professor in Operations Management and Information Systems at Santa Clara University. He is the Faculty Director of Graduate Business Programs of Leavey School of Business. Dr. Cai received his B.S. in physics from Peking University and his M.S. in business statistics and economics from the Guanghua School of Management at Peking University, and earned his Ph.D. in operations research from North Carolina State University. His research has been financially supported by the National Science Foundation of U.S.A. and the National Natural Science Foundation of China. He has published in Marketing Science, Production and Operations Management, Journal of Retailing, and Decision Sciences. He is the recipient of the Best Paper Award of Fifth International Conference on Electronic Commerce, Kansas State University President’s Faculty Development Award, CBA Fellowship, CBA Outstanding Contributions in Research Award, and Santa Clara University Dean's Award for Scholarship Excellence. He has also won a number of teaching awards in both public and private universities, including Ralph Reitz Outstanding Teaching Award in Kansas State University (one per year in the business school) and Leavey Impact Award for Teaching ?(at most one per year in the business school) and multiple Dean's Award for Teaching Excellence in Santa Clara University. He is an Associate Editor and guest Senior Editor of Decision Sciences Journal and Editorial Board Member of Production and Operations Management Journal.
講座（6）
題 目：Opaque Distribution Channels for Competing Service Providers: Posted Price vs. Name-Your-Own-Price Mechanisms
報告人：陳榮副教授，University of California at Davis（美國）
時 間：6月20日（周六）10:20-11:50
地 點：行政樓128會議室
報告摘要：
Opaque selling has been widely adopted by service providers in the travel industry to sell off leftover capacity under stochastic demand. We consider a two stage model to study the impact of different selling mechanisms, Posted Price (PP) vs. Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP), of an opaque reseller on competing service providers who face forward-looking customers. We find that in this environment, providers prefer that the opaque reseller uses a posted price instead of a bidding model. This is because the ability to set retail prices is critical for extracting surplus from customers who wait to purchase from the reseller. Such surplus extraction enables providers to set high prices for advance sales and obtain high profits. The dominance of PP over NYOP disappears, however, when competition between sellers is minimal or absent. We extend our model to multiple opaque resellers who compete in selling off last-minute capacity for service providers, and find that our main insights continue to hold with differentiated resellers. Despite providers’ preference in favor of PP, there are circumstances under which the opaque reseller earns higher profits under NYOP. Leisure customers might also prefer the bidding mechanism, which allows them to retain some surplus. This can help explain the rapid growth of the NYOP model over the last decade. Our findings are consistent with the evolution of opaque selling in the travel industry, and in particular, the recent trend towards more published price sales for opaque products.
報告人簡介：
Rachel R. Chen is an Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Management at University of California at Davis. She received her Ph.D. from the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University in 2003. Her research focuses on e-procurement and distribution in supply chains and the pricing of service operations. She has been a member of INFORMS since 1999.
